par Chen, Li 
Président du jury Gassner, Marjorie
Promoteur Cantillon, Estelle
Co-Promoteur Legros, Patrick
Publication Non publié, 2016-08-29
Président du jury Gassner, Marjorie
Promoteur Cantillon, Estelle
Co-Promoteur Legros, Patrick
Publication Non publié, 2016-08-29
Thèse de doctorat
| Résumé : | This thesis consists of three independent essays on the design of matching markets, with a primary goal to understand how information interacts with matching mechanisms especially in the applications to school choice and college admissions. The first chapter compares theoretically the non-strategyproof Boston mechanism and the strategy-proof deferred acceptance mechanism when taking into account that students may face uncertainty about their own priorities when submitting preferences, one important variation from the complete information assumption. The second chapter evaluates the effectiveness of a strategy-proof mechanism when students have to submit preferences before knowing their priorities using both theory and data. The third chapter turns attention to a new mechanism that is sequentially implemented and can encourage truth-telling. Nevertheless, such implementation often faces time constraint. This chapter therefore offers an inquiry of the pros and cons of the time-constrained sequential mechanism. |
