Travail de recherche/Working paper
| Résumé : | We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model with for-pro t rms, non-pro torganizations and endogenous private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use offunds implies that an increase of funds of the non-pro t sector (because of a higher incomein the for-pro t sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inflow of foreign aid) worsensthe motivational composition and performance of the non-pro t sector. We also analyze theconditions under which donors (through linking donations to the motivational composition of thenon-pro t sector), non-pro ts themselves (through peer monitoring), or the government (usinga tax- nanced public funding of non-pro ts) can eliminate the low-e¤ectiveness equilibrium. Wepresent supporting case-study evidence from humanitarian emergencies and developing-countryNGOs. |
