Articles dans des revues avec comité de lecture (35)
25.
Güth, W., Kirchsteiger, G., & Ritzberger, K. (1998). Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games. Games and Economic Behavior, 23(1), 54-74.
26.
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1998). Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets. European Economic Review, 42(1), 1-34.
27.
Kirchsteiger, G., & Puppe, C. (1997). On the possibility of efficient private provision of public goods through government subsidies. Journal of Public Economics, 66(3), 489-504.
28.
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1997). Reciprocity as a contract enforcement device: experimental evidence. Econometrica, 65(4), 833-860. doi:10.2307/2171941
29.
Kirchsteiger, G., & Puppe, C. (1997). On the formation of political coalitions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153(2), 293-319.
30.
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1996). Reciprocal fairness and noncompensating wage differentials. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152(4), 608-640.
31.
Kirchsteiger, G., & Puppe, C. (1996). Intransitive choices based on transitive preferences: the case of menu-dependent information. Theory and Decision, 41(1), 37-58.
32.
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1996). Involuntary unemployment and non-compensating wage differentials in an experimental labour market. The Economic Journal, 106(434), 106-121. doi:10.2307/2234934
33.
Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). The role of envy in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 25(3), 373-389.
34.
Fehr, E., & Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). Insider power, wage discrimination, and fairness. The Economic Journal, 104(424), 571-583. doi:10.2307/2234632
35.
Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G., & Riedl, A. (1993). Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(2), 437-459.
Rapports de recherche, comptes rendus, lettres à l'éditeur, working papers (4)
1.
Kirchsteiger, G., Lenaerts, T., & Suchon, R. (2022). Does Voluntary Information Disclosure Lead to Less Cooperation than Mandatory Disclosure? Evidence from a Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment. (ECARES Working Papers No 2022-26).