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Bidders' Entry and Auctioneers' Rejection: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions

par Estache, Antonio ;Iimi, A.
Publication Publié, 2009

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Titre:	Bidders' Entry and Auctioneers' Rejection: Applying a Double Selection Model to Road Procurement Auctions
Auteur:	Estache, Antonio; Iimi, A.
Statut de publication:	Publié, 2009
series:	ECARES Working papers, 2009_008
Sujet CREF:	Economie
Sujet JEL:	Auctions
	National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
	National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
	Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
	Firm Behavior
Volumes/pages:	25 p.
Mots-clés:	Public procurement
	auction theory
	endogenous bidder entry
	infrastructure development
Langue:	Anglais
Identificateurs:	RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_008