Titre:
  • Auctions with Endogenous Participation and Quality Thresholds: Evidence from ODA Infrastructure Procurement
Auteur:Estache, Antonio; Iimi, A.
Statut de publication:Publié, 2009
series:ECARES Working papers, 2009_006
Sujet CREF:Economie
Sujet JEL:Auctions
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
Volumes/pages:30 p.
Mots-clés:Public procurement
auction theory
infrastructure development
governance
Langue:Anglais
Identificateurs:RePEc:eca:wpaper:2009_006