par Richard, Sébastien 
Référence Revue philosophique de Louvain, 115, 4, page (619-645)
Publication Publié, 2017-11
Référence Revue philosophique de Louvain, 115, 4, page (619-645)
Publication Publié, 2017-11
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | The topic of this paper is the notion of truth in Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophy. Twardowski was a pupil of Brentano and promoted his method and ideas in Poland. However, he was more than just the propagator of the thought of his former master. As shown in the first two parts of this article, he opposed Brentano notably by defending an absolutist concept of truth. To this end, he first showed that the so-called examples of relative truths were ambiguous and could be completed in order to reveal the absolute judgments from which they are derived. He then highlighted the fact that the form of relativism according to which every judgment is true for us is incompatible with certain fundamental logical principles and cannot for this reason be deduced from a more general thesis. The last part of this article is devoted to Twardowski's criticism of the strong version of the correspondence theory of truth developed by Russell. Having set out the defects of this theory by criticising the concept of judgment on which it relies, he proposes a weakened version of this theory of truth relying on a concept of judgment as a sui generis act. |
