Résumé : We study how electoral incentives a.ect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which o.ce and policy motivated politicians choose to support or oppose regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians .ip-.op, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators’ votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with our model’s predictions, election proximity has a pro-gun e.ect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment e.ect on Republican senators. These e.ects only arise for non-retiring senators, who represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity has no impact on senators’ decisions on reproductive rights, because of the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.