par Brack, Nathalie 
;Costa, Olivier
Référence Hérodote, 164, page (199-212)
Publication Publié, 2017
;Costa, Olivier Référence Hérodote, 164, page (199-212)
Publication Publié, 2017
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | The empowerment of the European Parliament (EP) has been extensively studied, notably in relation to the democratic deficit of the European Union (EU). However, the organization of parliamentary work and its impact for the democratic nature of the EU have been largely overlooked so far. This article aims therefore at analyzing the reforms of the rules of procedure and what is at stake during those reforms. We show that there have been numerous reforms since the 1980s, justified by the so-called «efficiency» of parliamentary work. With those reforms, the EP's President and the conference of the presidents as well as the main political groups have been empowered whereas the role of individual members in the European parliament (MEP) has been significantly reduced. Debates in plenary and MEPs' behavior have been more strictly regulated, leaving MEPs with a restricted room for maneuver. The advocates of these reforms have argued that it is the best way for the EP to use the full potential of its formal power and to ensure the credibility of the EP in the interinstitutional negotiations. At the same time, the analysis reveals that these reforms jeopardize the representativeness of the institution and make it more difficult for citizens to understand what is at stake in the parliamentary debates in the EU. |
