par De Callataÿ, Etienne;Gillet, Roland 
Référence Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, 49, 1, page (59-70)
Publication Publié, 2010-04
Référence Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, 49, 1, page (59-70)
Publication Publié, 2010-04
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | The credit crisis of 2007-2009 can be partly explained by the perverse incentives provided by both income and tax policies. Income policies have been designed to address the principal-agent problem but have ended up giving a strong incentive to maximize short term profits. Combined with asymetric pay-off structures, it led to risk-lover behaviors that turned to be detrimental to the organizations and their stakeholders. Tax policies have promoted indebtness through the tax deductibility of interest charges for coroporations and of mortgage for households. Differences in tax treatment have also led to the substitution of more lightly taxed stock options and capital gains to regular remunerations. A side effect of this arbitrage has been to reinforce risk-taking behaviors. |
