par Brihaye, Thomas;Geeraerts, Gilles 
;Haddad, Axel;Monmege, Benjamin ;Pérez, Guillermo G.A.;Renault, Gabriel
Référence Leibniz international proceedings in informatics, 45, page (293-306)
Publication Publié, 2015
;Haddad, Axel;Monmege, Benjamin ;Pérez, Guillermo G.A.;Renault, GabrielRéférence Leibniz international proceedings in informatics, 45, page (293-306)
Publication Publié, 2015
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | We study a generalisation of sabotage games, a model of dynamic network games introduced by van Benthem [16]. The original definition of the game is inherently finite and therefore does not allow one to model infinite processes. We propose an extension of the sabotage games in which the first player (Runner) traverses an arena with dynamic weights determined by the second player (Saboteur). In our model of quantitative sabotage games, Saboteur is now given a budget that he can distribute amongst the edges of the graph, whilst Runner attempts to minimise the quantity of budget witnessed while completing his task. We show that, on the one hand, for most of the classical cost functions considered in the literature, the problem of determining if Runner has a strategy to ensure a cost below some threshold is EXPTIME-complete. On the other hand, if the budget of Saboteur is fixed a priori, then the problem is in PTIME for most cost functions. Finally, we show that restricting the dynamics of the game also leads to better complexity. |
