par Bazan, Ariane ;Detandt, Sandrine
Référence JCFAR. Journal of the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, 26, page (99-127)
Publication Publié, 2015-07
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : In the most general terms, neuropsychoanalysis proposes a conceptual elaboration at the interface of psychoanalysis and neuroscience. Its main actors and approaches are multiple and diverse (Shevrin, Bond, Brakel, Hertel & Williams, 1996; Solms 1997; 2000; Brakel, 1997; Panksepp, 1998; Shevrin, 2003; Ansermet & Magistretti, 2007; Bazan, 2007; Fotopoulou, 2010) but among all those, the epistemological line most held is the so-called « dual aspect monism » perspective (Solms & Turnbull, 2003). This perspective holds that “our brains, including mind, are made of one kind of stuff, cells, but we perceive this stuff in two different ways.” (Solms & Turnbull 2003, pp. 56-58; our Italics). One is the neuroscientists "objective" way or the brain, which we dissect “with scalpel and microscope or look at it with brain scans and then trace neurochemical pathways”. The other way is the psychoanalysts’ “subjective” way or the mind: “how we feel and what we think. Freud refined this kind of observation into free association”. As, however there is only one object, in the end, there is a more or less linear correspondence between phenomena of the brain and phenomena of the mind. Research follows the classical paradigm: neurophysiologic observations are connected to behavioral or personality characteristics; knowledge about the brain can be (directly) useful for psychoanalytic clinical work.