par Levy, Marc 
Référence European journal of operational research, 215, 2, page (411-421)
Publication Publié, 2011-12
Référence European journal of operational research, 215, 2, page (411-421)
Publication Publié, 2011-12
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | In this global world, many firms present a complex shareholding structure with indirect participation, such that it may become difficult to assess a firm's controllers. Furthermore, if there are numerous dominant shareholders, the control can be shared between them. Determining who has the most influence is often a difficult task. To measure this influence, game theory allows the modeling of voting games and the computing of the Banzhaf index. This paper firstly offers a new algorithm to compute this index in all structures and then suggests some modelisations of the floating shareholder. Then, our model is applied to a real case study: the French group Lafarge. This exemplary case demonstrates how the float's structure and hidden coalition can impact the power relationship between dominant shareholders. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
