par Detandt, Sandrine 
;Askari, Sarah;Olyff, Giulia ;Bazan, Ariane
Référence 15th International Neuropsychoanalysis Congress: Current Neuropsychoanalytic Research (25.07.2014: New York, USA)
Publication Non publié, 2014-07-24
;Askari, Sarah;Olyff, Giulia ;Bazan, Ariane Référence 15th International Neuropsychoanalysis Congress: Current Neuropsychoanalytic Research (25.07.2014: New York, USA)
Publication Non publié, 2014-07-24
Poster de conférence
| Résumé : | Based on radically different empirical approaches (respectively psychoanalytic practice, neurosciences and psychological statistical methods), three different domains concerned with what it means to be human, have independently formulated three parallel dichotomies of appreciation and apprehension.Jouissance is a Lacanian concept [1, 2, 3] impervious to cognitive neurosciences, understood as a form of unconscious « benefit » explaining i.a. the frequency of relapses in addiction. It has been conceptualized by psychoanalysis in contrast with the concept of pleasure. Earlier, we proposed a conceptual parallel between these concepts and the neuroscientific notions of “wanting” and “liking” [4]. We proposed to understand jouissance as the benefit gained from the motor tension underlying the action which was (once) adequate in bringing relief to the drive and therefore it is akin to the notion of wanting, which is tied to a body action that was rewarded before [4]. Pleasure and jouissance, liking and wanting, being distinct, human suffering (and psychopathology) results from motor patterns remaining jouissive or wanted, while no longer pleasurable, adequate nor liked [4].Now, in cognitive sciences, multivariate studies [5, 6, 7] have also consistently found a simple dual structure to account for the most variance among affective verbal descriptors. As valence varies between positive or pleasant or appetitive and negative or aversive [8], and as arousal is defined as an intensity of bodily activation [7], this dichotomy has remarkable parallels with the dichotomies of pleasure and jouissance, and of liking and wanting, in psychoanalysis and neurosciences, respectively.The translation of these three paradigms into the lab, consists, in a population of cigarette addicts vs. controls primed by cigarette stimuli, of combined measurements of approach biases in a Go/NoGo task (wanting, neurosciences), an evaluation of free associations by naïve judges on a number of questions derived from Lacan’s seminars (jouissance, psychoanalysis), as well as with self- and other-judgments on the Self Assessment Manikin Scale (arousal, cognitive psychology) [6].References[1] Lacan, J. (1967). Psychanalyse et médecine in Lettres de l’Ecole freudienne de Paris, n°1, Paris.[2] Lacan, J. (1959-1960/1986). Le séminaire. Livre VII. L'éthique de la psychanalyse, Champ freudien, Paris : Seuil.[3] Lacan, J., (1969-1970/1991). Le Séminaire, livre XVII: l'envers de la psychanalyse.- Seuil.[4] Bazan, A., and Detandt, S. (2013). On the physiology of jouissance: interpreting themesolimbic dopaminergic reward functions from a psychoanalytic perspective.Front. Hum. Neurosci, 7:709. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00709[5] Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., and Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). The measurement of meaning. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.[6] Bradley, M. M., and Lang, P. J. (1994). Measuring emotion: SAM and the semantic differential. Journal of Experimental Psychiatry & Behavior Therapy, 25, 49–59.[7] Verschuere, B., Crombez, G., and Koster, E. (2001). The International Affective Picture System: A Flemish Validation Study. Psychologica Belgica, 41:4, 205-17.[8] Russell, J. A., and Mehrabian, A. (1977). Evidence for a three-factor theory of emotions. Journal of Research in Personality, 11, 273–294.[9] Lang, P. J. (2010). Emotion and Motivation: Toward Consensus Definitions and a Common Research Purpose, Emotion Review, 2: 229. DOI: 10.1177/1754073910361984 |
