par Carrillo, Juan 
;Dewatripont, Mathias
Référence Economic journal, 118, 531, page (1453-1473)
Publication Publié, 2008
;Dewatripont, Mathias Référence Economic journal, 118, 531, page (1453-1473)
Publication Publié, 2008
Article révisé par les pairs
| Résumé : | We consider a hyperbolic discounting individual who has the ability to make promises which are costly to break. We first identify conditions under which promises made are kept, and conditions under which they are (partially) broken. Second, we provide microeconomic foundations for the effectiveness of contractual promises. Specifically, we show how the cost of breaking promises can be reinterpreted in terms of either a reputation loss in the presence of incomplete information or a financial loss under monitoring and explicit contracting. The results imply that strategic interactions between hyperbolic discounting individuals may serve as a commitment mechanism against intrapersonal conflicts. © Journal compilation © 2008 by the Royal Economic Society. |
