par Vannini, Stefano;Bughin, Jacques
Référence European economic review, 44, 9, page (1763-1781)
Publication Publié, 2000
Article révisé par les pairs
Résumé : This paper analyses the decision by firms under Cournot oligopoly as to recognize unions in order to gain market power despite higher costs. Considering classical models of union-firm bargaining, namely right-to-manage (RTM) and efficient bargaining (EB), we show that, for a sufficiently low level of union power EB firms might adopt cost-raising strategies. This theoretical prediction is compatible with some empirical evidence in favour of EB, and adds to the theoretical finding that EB might dominate RTM under unionized Cournot-Nash oligopoly. It also suggests closer antitrust scrutiny as whether unions can provide cartel-like services to oligopoly firms, allowing them to distort product market competition at the expense of consumers. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.